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INTRODUCTION 
In its memorandum of March 1970 on a 
common industrial policy for the European 
Community, the Commission gave three reasons 
why such a policy is required. These are: 
- to improve the working of the single 
Community market through enhanced 
industrial integration; 
- to assure continued economic growth by 
helping firms and industries to adapt themselves 
to changing conditions; and 
- to achieve a reasonable degree of economic 
and technological independence from the 
Community's major trading partners. 
Two further objectives have since been added: 
a better geographical distribution of industry 
and hence of economic growth within the 
Community, and the protection of the 
environment. These objectives, which are matters 
of social and political choice, are not explicity 
defined by the Rome Treaty, which makes 
no mention of any common policy for 
industry. Under the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and Euratom Treaties, 
the Community has certain statutory powers 
over the coal, steel and nuclear industries; but 
this responsibility is limited. The European 
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty provides 
for the establishment of common policies for 
transport and agriculture; but the need for a 
common policy for the development of 
industry was not foreseen. 
The reason for this omission is not that the 
authors of the Rome Treaty were ignorant of 
the crucial importance of industry for the 
Community's development. Their policy for 
industry is summed up in the Treaty's general 
rules. 
The Treaty's theme is the creation of a single 
market in which free and fair competition 
at Community level must be guaranteed. It was 
realized that government aids to industry and 
other forms of state intervention in the 
economy could hardly be avoided altogether. 
But these must remain exceptions, rather than 
as a means to an end. The transformation of 
industry should be the spontaneous consequence 
of the creation of the Common Market, 
rather than as a process requiring planning. 
Long before the end of the 1960s, however, 
it had become clear that the process of 
economic integration could not be limited to 
the establishment of a customs union for 
industrial goods, a common system of 
agricultural support and the free movement 
of labour and capital, helped by a growing 
degree of fiscal harmonization. This market-
oriented concept of economic integration 
ignored the fact that the industrial development 
of a modern society-including such questions 
as the rundown or rationalization of traditional 
industries, the development of new industries, 
and the balanced distribution of industrial 
activity over the country or region as a whole-
is to an increasing extent determined by 
governments. 
Even after the removal of tariffs, national 
authorities can still call on a panoply of 
instruments, ranging from capital grants and 
loans through tax incentives of all kinds, to 
research and development contracts and 
guaranteed public orders. In the absence of an 
overall Community policy or machinery for 
coordinating Member-State strategies, it was 
inevitable that governments would look to 
the development of their own industries with 
the various means at their disposal, however 
incoherent-or self-defeating-the results. 
It is against this background that the growing 
pressure for a Community industrial policy 
should be seen. 
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FIRST STEPS 
During the Sixties, the Community became 
involved with questions of industrial policy 
mainly from three directions. As might be 
expected, the need for a common policy first 
became apparent in the field of trade. In the 
course of the Kennedy round of trade 
negotiations in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the Community was 
forced to define which branches of industry 
stood in need of special protection and should 
therefore be excluded from tariff cuts. Although 
these negotiations made the Community 
authorities more aware of the structural problems 
of those industries which were particularly 
sensitive to international competition, the scope 
for action was limited by the basically 
outward-looking philosophy of the Community. 
Rather more important for the development 
of the Community's industrial policy was the 
problem of government aids to industry. 
The Commission never considered that its role 
was to eliminate all forms of government aid 
in the name of competition, while ignoring 
the pressure on governments to maintain 
employment, or the need to encourage 
technological innovation and structural change. 
On the other hand, the Commission is 
responsible under the EEC Treaty for seeing 
that government aids to industry are not allowed 
to distort competition within the Common 
Market. In practice this proved far easier said 
than done. 
The major difficulty came from the enormous 
diversity of national situations and policies, 
the frequent confusion between aids to particular 
branches of industry and aids for the purpose 
of maintaining employment in particular 
regions, and the impossibility of evaluating 
with any kind of accuracy the total impact of 
government aids on a particular sector. To 
these difficulties must be added the limitations 
inherent in the legal basis of the Commission's 
powers. 
Under articles 92 to 94 of the EEC Treaty the 
Commission may intervene only to disallow 
government aids with an adverse effect on the 
trade of other Member States. It has no author-
ity to forbid particular aids because it considers 
them ineffective or self-defeating, nor until 
recently was it prepared to suggest alternative 
solutions to the structural problems which the 
aids in question were designed to solve. Yet 
without an overall view of the structural 
problems facing Community industry, and of the 
most appropriate solutions, the Commission had 
no valid criteria for judging the legitimacy of 
either the aims pursued or the means employed 
by the Member States. 
This situation is now changing as the 
Commission increasingly defines its policy 
on government aids in the light of the 
Community's industrial-policy objectives. 
Economic coordination 
The third factor which contributed to the 
pressure for a common industrial blueprint was 
the growing consensus within the Community 
that better coordination of Member States' 
economic policies was needed, as their economic 
interdependence became more marked. 
The first medium-term economic policy 
programme, adopted in 1966, paid little attention 
to the problems of industry as such; but the 
second programme, adopted in December 1968, 
included a chapter on general measures to 
strengthen Community industry. It also 
recommended the Community institutions to 
work out guidelines for the development of 
specific industrial sectors. 
The recognition by governments of the need 
for a Community industrial policy had already 
been anticipated by the Commission. The 
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merger in July 1967 of the executives of the 
ECSC, Euratom and EEC, gave the new 
Commission the opportunity to set up a separate 
directorate for industrial affairs, which was 
subsequently also given responsibility for science 
and technology, another sector ignored by the 
Rome Treaty. This development is reflected 
in the annual reports published by the 
Commission, which since 1968 have always 
included a section on the problems of 
Community industry. 
In the course of the last five years the Commission 
has acquired a considerable knowledge of the 
problems of particular industries, ranging 
from the advance-technology sectors, such as 
aircraft and nuclear power, to the more 
traditional industries. 
The Commission generally studies the structure 
of the industry, the technological trends, the 
projections of future demand and the 
competition from non-member countries. The 
resulting reports form a basis for consultations 
with relevant national administrations and the 
representatives of the industry's employer and 
trade union organizations. This process has 
done much to create a greater awareness of the 
problems and the opportunities facing 
Community industry. But this sectoral approach 
does not in itself amount to a true common 
industrial policy. 
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ANALYSIS AND GUIDELINES 
It was the need for a common industrial 
policy that the Commission set out to satisfy 
with its memorandum, submitted to the Council 
in March 1970. This document did not attempt 
to analyse the problems of particular sectors 
but to provide a comparative analysis of 
industry in the Community and in other major 
industrialized powers, it also sought to define 
certain overall guidelines for promoting industrial 
development in the Community. 
The memorandum contained new proposals, 
some of which were covered by the Rome 
Treaty, while others broke new ground; but its 
main purpose was to create a greater awareness 
that governments and industry alike could not 
draw the full benefits from the creation of the 
Common Market unless a common industrial 
policy was launched. 
The proposals put forward in the memorandum 
reflected five main themes: 
1. The removal of the remaining barriers to the 
establishment of a single market embracing 
the whole Community; 
2. The creation of a unified business environment, 
involving the harmonization of company law 
and taxation, and the creation of a Community 
capital market; 
3. The reorganization of industry to take 
account of the dimensions of the Common 
Market; 
4. The promotion of technological progress in 
the Community; 
5. The need to recognize the social and regional 
aspects of industrial development. 
The creation of a 
single market 
One of the Community's major aims as defined 
by the Rome Treaty is the free movement of 
goods within the Common Market. This is not 
an end in itself, but a means of providing 
European firms with a domestic market big 
enough to exploit modern production methods 
and so enable them to compete more effectively 
with the industrial giants in the United States 
and Japan. 
The removal of tariff barriers between the Six, 
completed in 1968, has had a dramatic effect 
on intra-Community trade, which increased 
by no less than 250 per cent during the first ten 
years of the Common Market. (World trade 
increased during the same period by 90 per 
cent.) Yet the six Member States are far from 
constituting a single market with the same 
characteristics as a domestic market. In some 
sectors the Common Market can be said to 
exist on paper only. 
The first set of obstacles to the establishment 
of a unified market are 'technical' barriers 
to trade. These have two roots: differences 
between each nation's labour and industrial 
law, imposed in the interests of safety, public 
health, the protection of the environment or fair 
trade; and differences in the technical norms 
and specifications legally or tacitly applied 
by industry in each country. 
The practical consequence of these divergences 
is that a product manufactured according to 
the rules and norms applied in one member 
country frequently cannot be sold in other 
member countries without modification. 
Firms must therefore bear the expense of 
separate production runs and duplicating stocks. 
The additional risk and expense often 
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discourage smaller firms from entering foreign 
markets. 
Even larger firms, who can spread the cost 
over much longer production runs, are unable 
to achieve full economies of scale. Conversely, 
the maintenance of national regulations and 
norms can be an effective means of providing 
continued protection for domestic industry 
after tariff removal. 
The legal basis for tackling the problem of 
technical barriers to trade is article 100 of the 
EEC Treaty, which provides for the harmon-
ization of national laws or administrative 
provisions having a direct effect on the 
establishment or functioning of the Common 
Market. The elimination of technical barriers to 
trade has proved an extremely difficult, time-
consuming process. Even where national 
regulations are not disguised protectionism, it is 
hard to overcome the in-built conservatism 
of national administrations, let alone obtain 
unanimous agreement on common standards of 
health, safety or pollution control. Last, but 
by no means least, action on a case-by-case 
basis is liable to be paralyzed by the inevitable 
tendency of governments to insist on reciprocity 
for every concession made. 
Harmonization of 
technical legislation 
In May 1969, the Council of Ministers 
adopted a general programme submitted by the 
Commission to harmonize technical regulations 
over the whole field of industry, including 
food-processing. 
So far, the Commission has submitted more 
than 50 draft directives in this field. Among the 
methods used are 'total' and 'optional' 
harmonization. 
Under the first procedure, member states agree 
on common specifications that replace 
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national standards. Products must conform to 
the common rules to be sold in the Community. 
Under the second procedure, Member States 
jointly work out common rules that co-exist 
with national specifications. Products that meet 
the common standards cannot be refused entry 
by a member state. 
All the methods oblige Member States to adapt 
their laws and regulations so that Member 
States' products that conform to the common 
specifications can be freely imported by partner 
states in the Community. 
The corollary of this is the recognition by each 
Member State of controls and inspection 
carried out in others. A Council of Ministers 
resolution to this effect is annexed to the 1969 
general programme. The Commission aims 
wherever possible to use the specifications 
drawn up by the relevant professional body and 
international organization. 
It was recognized that harmonization of 
technical regulations is likely to be a never-ending 
process. The general programme approved by 
the Council therefore also included a standstill 
clause whereby Member States undertook not to 
introduce new rules during the various stages 
of the harmonization procedure, and accepted 
a simplified procedure for modifying directives 
already adopted, so as to bring them into 
line with technical advances. In its industrial-
policy memorandum, the Commission suggested 
that Member Governments wishing to introduce 
new regulations should give precedence to the 
adoption of a Community directive, so as to 
avoid creating new barriers to trade. 
The rate at which the general programme has 
been implemented has been slower than 
expected when it was prepared. In 1969 the 
Council adopted only one of the 44 directives 
due for adoption that year. The Council 
adopted only 20 more in the following years. 
The system has its shortcomings. There is the 
delay involved in obtaining unanimous 
agreement in the Council on every draft 
directive put forward by the Commission. 
This slowness of the Community decision-making 
process increases the risk of unilateral 
initiatives by Member States. In addition, 
implementation of Community rules is 
entrusted to national authorities, and this is 
liable to lead to divergent interpretations. 
The pressure on governments to introduce 
unilateral measures is particularly strong in the 
bid to protect the environment. Either 
governments take isolated measures, at the 
risk of creating new barriers to trade, or they 
hold back from taking the necessary steps 
to deal with pollution, for fear of penalizing 
their own industry. 
The Commission has since put forward a 
programme of action for the protection of the 
environment in which it seeks to overcome 
these problems and win recognition that it 
needs a stronger right of initiative. 
Another way of speeding up work in the 
Council of Ministers would be the adoption 
of grouped, rather than individual directives. 
This could make it easier to obtain the necessary 
unanimity, in that Member States would agree 
on mutual concessions. Such a strategy would in 
any case correspond to the Commission's views 
when it was preparing the general programme: 
instead of trying to solve problems in isolation, 
the Commission thought it better to present 
an overall framework that would enable 
Member States to grasp more effectively all the 
goals being aimed at in a given sector. 
Resistance among producers 
and consumers 
Another obstacle to the establishment of a 
genuine common market lies in ingrained 
resistance to competition, found among both 
producers and consumers. Firms are slow to 
adapt their products to tastes or requirements of 
consumers in another country, particularly if 
they have been used to exploiting more or 
less captive markets. Consumers often show 
loyalty to "national" goods and are slow 
to exploit the greater choice created by the 
Common Market. However, these psychological 
obstacles to the creation of a single European 
market, without ever disappearing entirely, 
are likely to diminish in time, at least as far as 
the private sector is concerned. 
More serious are attempts by some producers 
and distributors to limit competition artificially 
-for example, by using distribution and licence 
agreements to divide the Common Market 
into separate national components. Restrictive 
business practices of this kind are forbidden 
under article 85 of the EEC Treaty; but their 
complete elimination is a slow process. The 
Commission's efforts to enforce the rules 
of competition are nevertheless an essential 
element in its overall policy for industry, and 
in its policy to protect consumers. 
Opening public markets 
An even more serious threat to the Common 
Market lies in the tendency of national 
administrations to favour their local industries 
when giving out supply contracts, even in 
advanced technology industries, where national 
markets are often too small to make local 
firms competitive. As a result, those industries 
which stand to gain most from a single market 
-nuclear power, electrical generators, 
computers, telecommunications, aerospace, 
and transport equipment-have hardly benefited 
from the creation of the Common Market. 
Public markets are theoretically already open 
to competition from all member states. In 
practice a directive as such is unlikely to have 
much effect on the close working relationship 
which usually exists between national 
administrations and their traditional suppliers 
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(and which is often accompanied by differences 
in national specifications). Nor is it possible 
to ignore the political pressures on governments 
to give preference to home-country suppliers, 
whether for reasons of industrial development 
or regional employment. 
There is also the delicate problem of reciprocity, 
since governments are naturally unwilling to 
open their own public markets to international 
competition in sectors where their own industry 
is unlikely to gain, unless they have a reasonable 
assurance that their industry will be able to 
benefit from the opening of other Member 
States' public markets in other sectors. 
The Commission has accordingly proposed 
the adoption of a concerted policy of public 
purchases covering all sectors of industry, 
and ranging from simple persuasion backed by 
the publication of regular statistics to joint 
purchasing where appropriate. For advance-
technology industries, joint public purchases, 
possibly combined with Community research and 
development contracts, could be used to 
encourage the formation of transnational 
European industrial groups which could 
compete on equal terms with their American 
rivals. 
Reshaping community 
industry 
The policy's second major objective is to 
improve structure and, in some cases, the 
dimensions of Community industry and to 
reduce the economic disparities between different 
regions. The Commission's memorandum of 
1970 demonstrated that while member states' 
firms had taken advantage of the Common 
Market to expand production and increase 
exports, they had by and large failed to acquire 
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the greater research or financial resources 
needed to take full advantage of the single 
market and to compete successfully with 
non-Community companies in Europe and 
elsewhere. 
Analyzing the experience of the Community's 
first ten years, the Commission pointed out 
that American companies had profited most 
from the creation of the Common Market. 
This was partly due to their technological and 
managerial superiority-the subject of anguished 
debate in Europe throughout the 1960s. It also 
indicated that American firms were psycho-
logically better prepared to look on a continent 
as a single market. Because they were not 
identified with any one European country it 
was easier for them to plan their operations on 
a wider basis. 
The reaction of European firms to the challenge 
of increased international competition, caused 
by the establishment of the Community, was 
essentially defensive. Numerous firms allowed 
themselves to be taken over by American 
companies looking for a bridgehead inside the 
Community, or sought out American partners in 
preference to Europeans, hoping to benefit 
from superior technology, financial resources 
and marketing ability. There was a wave of 
mergers between European firms, but for 
a variety of reasons, including government 
policy, these mergers took place almost 
exclusively within national frontiers. 
The number of genuine European transnational 
mergers during the Community's first 15 years 
can be counted on the fingers of one hand. 
The process of industrial concentration, which 
in principle is a desirable consequence of 
the creation of the Community-has thus taken 
place within each national framework-though 
the market within which industry has to operate 
is increasingly a continental, even a global one. 
Apart from the threat to competition from a 
situation where each country's major sectors 
of industry are dominated by a single national 
company, this trend can only hinder the 
emergence of transnational groups capable 
of competing successfully with other large 
firms on European and global markets. 
The Commission's strategy for dealing with 
this situation is twofold. The basic long-term 
aim is the creation of a unified business 
environment, as regards company law, taxation 
and access to capital markets, so as to eliminate 
the institutional obstacles to cross-frontier 
mergers. The Commission also proposes to 
intervene directly to encourage inter-European 
industrial cooperation, including mergers. 
Tax harmonization 
The creation of a unified business environment 
means in the first place harmonization of 
national tax systems. In the long run this will 
involve the harmonization of turnover tax 
as well as of direct taxes on company profits 
and company income, so as to prevent the 
distortion of competition in the Community. 
The immediate aim, however, is the elimination of 
certain specific examples of fiscal discrimination 
against cross-frontier mergers or takeovers. 
The Commission has put forward draft fiscal 
directives. One deals with taxation of capital 
gains when the assets of one company are 
transferred to another. Another concerns 
taxation on the transfer of capital. Both of 
these taxes are normally waived or reduced for 
domestic mergers. Other measures concern 
double taxation on the profits of foreign 
branches and subsidiaries, and discriminatory 
withholding taxes on the branches of foreign 
companies. 
Company law 
Harmonization of company law is equally 
important. Intra-Community links are hindered 
not only by differing laws on the rights of 
shareholders and third parties, and the disclosure 
of financial information, but also by the greater 
cost and difficulty of international mergers and 
acquisitions of companies compared with 
national ones. 
Only two measures of harmonization in this 
sector have so far been achieved-a multilateral 
convention on the mutual recognition of 
companies under article 222 of the EEC Treaty, 
and a directive on the validity of company 
acts under article 45 (iii) (g), both adopted in 
1968. Since then the Commission has submitted 
draft directives aimed at harmonizing national 
legislation on increases or reductions of capital, 
the merger of companies within one country, 
and the rules for the presentation of company 
accounts. A further draft directive will deal 
with the problem of consolidated group 
accounts. The Commission is also working 
on a second multilateral convention on 
transfrontier mergers. 
A major obstacle to the formation of genuine 
European companies is the absence of a 
common European law. A merged company 
must operate under the national law of the 
country of incorporation-which can raise 
political problems between potential partners. 
Analysis of existing cross-frontier mergers 
shows that however for the partners are 
prepared to take the rationalization of 
production, research or marketing, ownership 
and control are based as far as possible on 
an equal partnership between the two founding 
companies. 
In order to get round this problem, the 
Commission in July 1970 relaunched its 
proposal-based on the report of an independent 
group of experts-for the establishment of a 
European company statute. This would enable 
companies involved in a cross-frontier merger 
to opt for the status of a Societas Europea 
with a common legal personality throughout 
the Community. 
The proposed European company, however 
desirable as a long-term aim, raises almost as 
9 
many problems as it solves. These range from 
the legal basis of the "European company" 
in Community or national law, the conditions 
of access, the choice between bearer or nominal 
shares, the question of tax liability and, last 
but not least, the provision for workers' 
representatives on the supervisory board, based 
on the German Mitbestimmung system. The 
disagreements between Member States on these 
points, which reflect differing national traditions, 
suggest that the European company statute 
will be the culmination of the process of 
harmonizing company law rather than the first 
step to it. 
Encouraging transnational 
cooperation 
There are nevertheless other ways of encouraging 
industrial integration across frontiers. In its 
1970 memorandum the Commission recognized 
that the first stage in the emergence of 
European industrial groups is likely to take 
the form of cooperation between firms in 
different Member States, but this could be 
seriously hindered by an excessively strict 
interpretation of article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
banning restrictive business agreements within 
the Common Market. 
Since December 1971 the Commission has been 
empowered to authorize joint research and 
development or specialization agreements where 
aggregate sales of the firms involved represent 
less than ten per cent of the market or 
200 million units of account (about $205 m or 
£85 m). The Commission can also grant group 
exemptions for certain categories of agreements 
dealing with research and development, 
specialization, standardization of components 
and the commercial exploitation of industrial 
property. 
To facilitate cooperation between firms the 
Commission has also prepared a proposal on 
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the introduction by all Member States of 
groupements d'interet economique (economic-
interest groups), which at present exists only in 
France. The advantage of this formula is that 
it enables firms to cooperate for certain 
specified purposes (for example, joint purchasing, 
marketing, or research and development) while 
maintaining their separate legal existence and 
tax liability. Use of this formula has spread 
quickly since it was introduced in France a few 
years ago, which suggest it fills a need. 
Joint enterprise status 
The Commission has also proposed the extension 
to other industries of the status of ''joint 
enterprise", which is at present reserved for 
the nuclear sector. 
The Commission's draft regulation provides 
for the granting of joint-enterprise status in two 
cases: (i) when these is a total or partial 
pooling of public-service activities in different 
member States; and (ii) when it is necessary 
to encourage activities of major European 
interest, from the point of view of technological 
development or the supply of raw materials. 
There is provision for financial participation by 
the Community as well as the granting of 
tax advantages. 
The question also arises whether the Community 
authorities should intervene directly to 
promote cross-frontier cooperation between 
Community firms. In its 1970 memorandum the 
Commission suggested closer cooperation 
between the various public agencies and private 
financial institutions concerned with promoting 
mergers at the national level. In addition, 
two specific proposals have been made. 
The first is for the creation of a European 
bureau to bring suitable firms together. It 
would act as an intermediary by providing firms 
with information about prospective partners 
in other countries and by advising on the 
complex problems involved in cross-frontier 
mergers and share acquisitions. If it proves 
difficult to set up such a bureau in the 
Community framework, it may be set up as an 
independent body sponsored by the Commission 
or the Union des Industries des Communautes 
Europeennes (UNICE). 
The second proposal would give the European 
Investment Bank a direct role in promoting 
cross-frontier mergers. In its 1970 memorandum 
the Commission underlined the role played by 
the Industrial Reorganization Corporation in 
Britain and the (then only proposed) Institut 
de Developpement Industriel in France in 
stimulating the reorganization of industry, and 
suggested that the EIB might be encouraged 
to use its financial resources in the same way. 
However, even if it was not necessary to modify 
the Bank's statutes, there would have to be 
a political decision by Member States to use the 
EIB for this purpose. 
Technological 
cooperation 
The third major objective of the Community's 
industrial policy is to promote the technological 
capacity of European industry. In the long run 
the commanding lead built up by some 
non-Community countries, especially the 
United States, in certain sectors of industry 
could threaten Europe's economic independence. 
The ability to keep ahead in technical progress 
is critical in all industries. Technological 
innovation is as important for traditional 
industries like steel, shipbuilding and textiles 
as it is for the more glamorous science-based 
industries, such as nuclear power, electronics and 
aerospace. 
The first problem is the scale of the research 
and development effort required to keep 
European industry in the forefront. In the 
course of the last five years most Member 
States have considerably expanded their R and 
D effort. On the whole their efforts have 
been on a purely national basis; they have 
often therefore been wasted through useless 
duplication. What is required is a common 
policy at Community level, involving the 
rationalization of national programmes and 
wherever possible a pooling of resources. 
The Community's record in this respect is less 
than satisfactory. In the only industrial sector 
for which the Treaties give the Community 
specific responsibility-atoms for peace-
Member States have reduced Euratom to a 
secondary role. Since 1967, the Council has 
been unable to agree on a long-term research 
programme and the Community has had to 
manage on one-year programmes renewed each 
year. European cooperation in the aerospace 
field has taken place entirely outside the 
Community framework and has been plagued 
by crises and withdrawals. 
The Council of Ministers decided in December 
1967 to launch a general programme of 
scientific and technological research and 
industrial innovation, using a working group 
of the Medium-Term Economic Policy 
Committee. The group's work proceeded 
slowly, and the programme finally adopted 
in November 1971 by 19 European governments 
is of limited scope. 
The enlargement of the Community should 
provide an opportunity for a new start. The 
Commission has already proposed the creation 
of a European committee on research and 
development, composed of independent high-
level experts, to advise Community authorities on 
aims and priorities. The Community would also 
have to establish machinery for coordinating 
Rand D policies, leading ultimately to joint 
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research programmes. What is required now is 
a political decision by Member States. 
Advanced technology 
To be effective, however, a common policy 
on science and technology should be integrated 
with the Community's industrial-policy 
objectives. This is particularly true for the 
so-called advanced technology sectors of 
industry-aerospace, telecommunications, 
computers, nuclear power-to which the 
Commission devoted an entire section of its 
industrial-policy memorandum. From the 
economic point of view these four industries 
have the most to gain from the wider market 
and enhanced Community resources. In practice, 
however, they have remained the preserve of 
economic nationalism. 
Governments have largely used scarceR and D 
resources, in order to build up national 
industries in these sectors, and they have 
supported them with guaranteed public orders. 
When they have taken part in international 
cooperation programmes, governments have 
often regarded international projects as a means 
of building up their national rather than a 
European industry. 
This helps explain the two great weaknesses of 
European intergovernmental cooperation so 
far: the insistence on the principle of "fair 
return", with contracts being distributed in 
proportion to each country's contribution 
to the common budget, rather than on the 
technical and economic qualifications of 
companies; and the tendency of governments 
to withdraw, or to refuse, continuing finance for 
a project, for purely national reasons. 
One of the basic aims of the Community's 
industrial policy must be to change this 
situation. The financial, industrial and even 
political problems involved in the development 
of a new generation of aircraft or nuclear 
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reactors are such that at this stage of integration 
they can be dealt with only through inter-
governmental agreements. 
It will certainly always be necessary to seek 
a certain balance of advantages gained by 
different Member States; but governments should 
be asked to accept that the principle of the 
''fair return" should be at the overall level 
rather than for each project, and also that 
public funds made available in these three 
sectors, whether in the form of research and 
development contracts or guaranteed public 
orders, should above all be used to encourage 
the reorganization of European industry into 
a few viable and internationally competitive 
groups straddling frontiers. This explains the 
importance of the Commission's proposals 
for a concerted policy of public purchases. 
From the point of view of Community industrial 
development, it is important that the problem 
of the advanced-technology sectors, however 
dramatic, should not be allowed to distract 
attention from other sectors of industry. An 
increasing percentage of all firms' Rand D 
is indirectly financed by governments through 
Rand D contracts, direct grants or loans 
repayable only in the event of commercial 
success. At present government R and D grants 
to private industry are granted within a purely 
national framework. As a result they constitute 
a further obstacle to cross-frontier cooperation 
and the emergence of European groups with 
adequate resources to match the R and D 
efforts of American competitors. 
One of the key suggestions in the Commission's 
armoury of proposals for a common industrial 
policy is the introduction of Community 
industrial development contracts. These 
contracts, which would take the form of 
subsidies repayable in case of success, would 
be specifically designed to encourage 
cooperation, as priority would be given to 
groups prepared to reorganize their activities 
on a European basis. 
As envisaged by the Commission, these 
contracts would cover both projects of general 
public interest, for example the development 
of new methods of transport or anti-pollution 
techniques, and the development of new 
industrial processes or products, in which case 
the initiative should come from private 
industry. The proposed extension of the 
joint-enterprise formula and the application 
of article 85 on restrictive business agreements 
in a more flexible way should also facilitate 
R and D cooperation. 
Employment 
The fourth major theme of the Community's 
industrial policy is the need to organize changes 
in the employment structure. The last ten 
years have seen massive transfers of employment 
not only from agriculture to industry but also 
within industry itself. Although some of these 
transfers have been stimulated by trade 
liberalization inside and outside the Common 
Market, many of the most dramatic employment 
shifts-such as the run-down of the coal 
industry or the transfer of steel production to 
coastal sites-have been the result of basic 
economic trends. 
In particular the gap between the most developed 
and the least developed regions has if anything 
widened, leading to increasingly severe problems 
of congestion, and conversely unemployment 
and migration. 
The magnitude of the transfers involved have 
created enormous political pressures on 
governments to attenuate economic and social 
effects. This has led to a startling growth in 
national aids to industry, both to shore up 
sectors in difficulty and to stimulate employment 
in declining or backward regions. In both 
cases, governments have tended to become 
involved in ruinous competition against one 
another, whether in subsidizing non-viable 
industries or firms, or in competing for new 
European or American investment. 
The Community can intervene at three levels. 
In the first place, under articles 92 to 94 of 
the EEC Treaty, the Commission has the role 
of supervising government aids to industry 
to ensure that these do not distort competition 
within the Common Market. The Treaty does 
not outlaw government aids to particular 
industries or regions as such, provided they 
do not affect trade between Member States. In 
spite of its powers, the Commission was for 
a long time virtually powerless to impose 
the rules of competition as a result of a lack 
of any agreed criteria for distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate aids. 
Regional aids 
This situation is rapidly changing. As far 
as regional aids are concerned, the council has 
fixed a ceiling of 20 per cent of the cost of 
any project after tax for aids granted within the 
central (i.e. highly-developed) regions of the 
original Community of Six, that is to say 
everywhere except the Italian Mezzogiorno, 
the west and south-west of France and the 
eastern border of Germany-for which special 
arrangements will be worked out later. 
Within central regions, government aids 
may not cover the entire national territory 
but must be confined to clearly defined areas 
where the economic justification in terms 
of unemployment or abnormally low incomes 
can be established. 
The point of this reform, which has been 
emphasized by the Commission in a series of 
recent decisions on aids to Rhineland-Westphalia 
and on the Belgian system of regional aids, 
is that by limiting the intensity of government 
help in the developed regions, the Community 
authorities will make it easier to attract 
industrial investment to the outlying areas 
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where the need is greatest, such as the south of 
Italy. But the rules do not preclude generous 
investment incentives where there is a real 
unemployment problem, for example in certain 
traditional industrialized areas dependent 
on a declining industry such as coal or textiles. 
Aids to sectors 
For aids to particular sectors of industry, the 
Commission has gradually established a basic 
doctrine. To be compatible with the Treaty, 
aids must be selective and temporary-that is, 
granted to firms or sectors only to help them 
rationalize their activities and become viable. 
Operating subsidies and unconditional aids 
not tied to any effort at rationalization will be 
disallowed. In its 1970 memorandum on 
industrial policy the Commission indicated 
that government aids could be justified only in 
these circumstances: 
1. When the inertia of the firms involved or 
the initial handicaps affecting the industry 
by comparison with foreign competition can be 
overcome only through direct intervention 
by the State, in particular by start-up aids to 
aerospace, computers, and nuclear power; 
2. When the common interest requires official 
intervention in order to stimulate or accelerate 
the rationalization or restructuring of the firms 
involved. This applies not only to traditional 
industries (coal, textiles, steel, shipbuilding) but 
also to key sectors of the economy such as 
chemicals, vehicles and heavy engineering; 
3. When difficulties experienced by Community 
industries result from artificial distortions of 
competition caused by non-member countries 
(shipbuilding). 
In many cases a particular industry will be 
facing similar if not identical problems in all 
the Member States. Rather than wait for 
governments to take the initiative, with the 
consequent risk that they will merely export 
14 
their ditTiculties to each other, the Commission 
is now prepared to intervene in advance, 
either by indicating the criteria it intends to 
apply in a particular sector or by proposing the 
coordination of national aids at Community 
level. 
In its memorandum of July 1971 on the textile 
industry, for example, the Commission stated 
that it would normally be prepared to approve 
any aid to encourage diversification out of 
textiles, but aids for modernization would be 
granted only on condition that they led to no 
increase in production. In the case of ship-
building, the Council has agreed to impose 
ceilings on government aids and export credit 
terms. 
Community finance 
The second way in which the Community can 
facilitate the necessary changes in the pattern of 
employment and contribute to a more balanced 
development of the different regions is 
through the increased use of Community 
financial resources. Indeed, there is a clear link 
between Community aids and the limitation 
of national aids. 
Until now the available instruments have been 
relatively modest. The European Investment 
Bank has made regional development loans 
totalling $2 thousand million, particularly in 
Italy's south, while the ECSC has contributed 
financially both to the costs of retraining 
440 000 workers no longer required by the coal 
or steel industries and to attracting new 
industries to affected regions. 
The European Social Fund has also contributed to 
the costs of retraining over 1 400 000 workers in 
different Member States, though approximately 
in proportion to Member States' own 
contributions to the Fund. 
Most of the Community's budget has always 
been devoted to the common agricultural 
policy, rather than to industry. 
The situation is beginning to change. The 
statutes of the Social Fund have been revised 
to enable it to play a more active role in 
financing occupational retraining and labour 
mobility. The Fund's future interventions wil1 be 
divided into two-those designed to remedy 
structural problems as in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, and those designed to attenuate 
the social consequences of policy decisions 
by Community authorities. 
Credits will initially be divided equally between 
the two categories, but the share going to the 
second type of intervention will be progressively 
increased. The Fund's resources are also being 
increased from their low initial level of less 
than 50 million units of account (plus 50 
million units under the old Fund) to around 
250 million units a year (1 unit of account 
= about £0.44 or $US 1.08). 
In addition to the reform of the Social Fund, 
the Community has set aside 50 milJion units a 
year in the agricultural budget for granting 
interest rebates to stimulate the creation 
of industrial employment in agricultural areas; 
while a decision was due to be taken before 
October 1972 on the creation of a regional 
development fund, This fund would be of 
particular interest to Italy, but the new 
members-especially Ireland and the 
United Kingdom-can also expect to benefit. 
Improved management 
The balanced development of industry and 
employment does not depend only on aids to 
industry, at the national or Community level. 
In its 1970 memorandum, the Commission 
emphasized that the creation of an adequate 
infrastructure in terms of communications and 
educational facilities is equally if not more 
important. 
The creation of adequate opportunities also 
depends on the quality of management; hence 
the Commission has encouraged the establishment 
of a European management foundation in 
Brussels. The Commission has also introduced 
a system of sectoral consultations with both 
sides of industry so as to identify production, 
technology and market trends sufficiently in 
advance for both management and workers 
to realize in time the need for adaptation and 
so plan accordingly. 
External relations 
The Community's industrial policy would be 
incomplete unless it was accompanied by 
a common policy towards non-Member countries. 
It is clearly undesirable that Member States 
should be able to favour their own firms in 
foreign markets, through national export credits 
or bilateral trade agreements, at the expense 
of firms from other Community countries. The 
Rome Treaty requires Member States to apply 
a common export policy, and this must be 
extended to cooperation with other member 
countries in the industrial and technological 
fields, as this is to an increasing extent 
replacing the simple trade agreement. 
It is also in the interests of Member States to 
negotiate as a unit with the other major 
industrialized powers such as the United States, 
the Soviet Union and Japan. This is particularly 
true as regards cooperation with the United 
States in such sectors as enriched uranium, 
reactor prototypes, space satellites and 
data-processing-where the Americans are 
the Community's principal partner and chief 
competitor. By maintaining bilateral relations, 
the European countries would perpetuate their 
present dependence. 
Up till now the Community's main experience 
of acting together in external affairs has been 
for trade negotiations, whether on a multilateral 
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basis in GATT or bilaterally. There are still 
large gaps in the common trade policy: both 
relations with the state-trading countries of 
eastern Europe and a large part of development 
aid programmes are conducted on a national 
basis. 
In both fields there is still a great deal of 
rivalry between Member States. This is equally 
true in advanced technology sectors of industry, 
where Member States tend to compete with 
each other in an attempt to capture 
foreign markets-generally with only limited 
success in the face of American competition. 
Relations with 
developing countries 
Independently of the natural desire by Member 
States to retain control of external relations, 
governments are likely to find themsleves under 
increasing pressure to act together. In their 
relations with developing countries, they are 
faced with demands not just for aid but also 
for improved market access for industrial 
exports through generalized tariff preferences, 
leading ultimately to the transfer of certain 
labour-intensive industries. A decision on an 
issue such as this can be taken only at 
Community level. 
Member States also have a common interest 
in ensuring adequate supplies of raw materials, 
including energy for their industry. The 
Commission therefore believes that Member 
States should adopt a joint policy on purchases 
of raw materials, such as petroleum, from 
developing countries; on investments in the 
Community by non-member developed countries; 
and on their relations with international 
organizations that deal with technological 
issues. 
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BEYOND EFFICIENCY 
The Commission's aim in publishing its 
industrial policy memorandum was to encourage 
officials, workers and business leaders to 
discuss the goals it proposed for the 
Community's industrial development. A 
far-ranging debate has started: the Council of 
Ministers set up a group of national experts 
in July 1970 to examine the main aspects of the 
memorandum; at same time, Member 
Governments, trade unions and employers' 
organizations have worked out their views. 
Overall, there has been general agreement on 
the Commission's ideas. 
Following the first reactions, the Commission 
has started to prepare specific proposals for 
Community action in different fields. It has, for 
example, called for the creation of a high-level 
ad hoc standing committee of representatives 
of national administrations; this group would 
study the problems of industrial development 
and help to launch the necessary coordination. 
The Commission has also proposed that 
joint-undertaking status be extended-at present 
the Community Treaties limit this privilege to 
nuclear-energy undertakings. 
The Commission has continued its consultations 
in order to prepare proposals on the creation 
of Community development contracts and the 
introduction of a statute enabling companies 
to set up Community economic-interest 
groupings. The Commission has also continued 
to analyze the problems of particular industries, 
with a view to formulating specific policy 
measures. Sector studies include aircraft 
construction, computers and data-processing, 
nuclear power and electricity generation, 
chemicals, textiles, shipbuilding, and paper. 
Studies are carried out in close consultation with 
leaders of industry; this could be the beginning 
of a process of permanent cooperation. 
Seeking.to promote industrial development, 
which is the aim of the Commission's 
memorandum, is far from being an adequate 
target in the second half of the 20th century. 
The Commission also needs to set the qualitative 
goals of industrial development. In a bid to 
stimulate joint reflection on this aspect, the 
Commission in April1972 invited leading 
personalities from the enlarged Community to 
a conference in Venice on "Industry and 
Society in the Community". Some 300 
participants, representing trade unions, 
employers and national administrations, 
worked out guidelines along which the 
Community could develop a specifically 
European industrial society. 
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